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April 3, 2017

Docket No: 50-424

NL-17-0510

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

> Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2017-001-00 Manual Reactor Trip due to Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure

#### Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report, 2017-001-00 for Unit 1. This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Dom Sutton at (706) 848-1428.

Respectfully submitted,

B. Keith Taber

Site Vice President - Vogtle

**BKT/IBW** 

Enclosure: Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2017-001-00

Southern Nuclear Operating Company CC:

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RType: CVC7000

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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# Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2017-001-00 Manual Reactor Trip due to Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure

**Enclosure** 

Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2017-001-00

NRC FORM 366 (05-2016)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | APPROVED BY OM8: NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 10/31/2018



#### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On February 03, 2017 at 1545 EST, Vogtle Unit 1 was operating in Mode 1 at 100 percent power when the Loop 1 Outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)[ISV], 1HV3006B, began drifting closed due to hydraulic oil leak. Operating crew identified the issue and initiated a manual reactor trip due to the MSIV[ISV] drifting closed. All control rods fully inserted and all equipment actuated as designed.

Unit 1 was stabilized in Mode 3 with the heat sink being maintained by Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)[BA] and through the Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs)[RV]. The Loop 1 MSIV[ISV] closing was caused by an o-ring failure that led to a loss of hydraulic oil used to maintain the MSIV[ISV] in the open position.

This event had no adverse effect on the health and safety of the public, and is of very low safety significance. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to manual and automatic actuation of a systems listed in 10CFR50.739(a)(2)(iv)(B). Unit 2 was unaffected.

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/">http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/</a>)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. LER NUMBER			
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant	05000-424	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	
		2017	- 001	- 00	

#### **NARRATIVE**

#### A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to unplanned manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), with auto actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System and Feedwater Isolation.

### B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

Mode 1, 100 percent power

#### C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On February 03, 2017 at approximately 1545 EST, the Unit 1 control room received a trouble alarm for Loop 1 MSIV (1HV-3006B). Immediately after the initial trouble alarm, a second alarm was received in the Main Control Room indicating 1HV-3006B was no longer in the full open position. The Operator at the Controls (OATC) attempted to re-open the valve manually by holding the control room handswitch in the open position. This was not effective as valve position continued to drift closed and steam flow continued to degrade until the Shift Supervisor (SS) directed a manual reactor trip. This manual trip resulted in an Emergency Safety Feature (ESF) automatic actuation for Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)[BA], Feedwater Isolation (FWI)[ISV], and Turbine Trip(TT), as expected. The operating crew stabilized plant in Mode 3 using the emergency operating procedures and decay heat was removed via the Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs)[RV].

#### D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the event was a failure of an o-ring on the MSIV lower manifold pressure boundary. The o-ring failure resulted in a loss of hydraulic pressure on the MSIV which caused the valve to drift closed. O-ring failed from extrusion because of radial misalignment.

#### E. SAFETY ASSESSMENT

Plant Operators took manual actions to shut down the Unit 1 reactor due to degrading plant conditions. ESF auto actuations for Auxiliary Feedwater, Feedwater Isolation and Turbine Trip occurred, as expected. Operating crew stabilized plant entering Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's) and transitioned to Unit Operating Procedures to maintain stable plant conditions. Because all systems responded as required and there were no actual adverse effects on the health and safety of the public. The safety significance of the event is considered very low.

#### F. CORRECTIVE ACTION

MSIV 1HV3006B was repaired by installing a carbon steel bushing in the manifold O-ring counter bore with a reduced diameter o-ring. Manual honing of the cylinder boss was performed to smooth the surface. The MSIV actuator was reassembled and functionally tested satisfactorily.

#### G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1)Previous Similar Events:

This MSIV previously closed at power in 2014.

#### 2)Commitment Information:

No commitments are made in this correspondence.